Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool for the RQ-11B Raven

Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool for the RQ-11B Raven

Platform Overview

            As of December 2011, U.S. Army unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have flown over 1.92 million combat hours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2016). Of these UAS, the small UAS (sUAS) RQ-11B Raven has distinguished itself as an easy-to-use, lightweight, and portable system for troops on the ground to gather intelligence data at their own discretion without use of larger aerial assets. The primary mission for this UAS is to serve as a low-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform. Each aerial vehicle has a remote video terminal for individual sUAS control, a ground control station (GCS), extra batteries, and a field repair kit; all of which can be assembled by the team in less than 5 minutes by a team of two personnel (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2016). The same hand controller that maneuvers the vehicle is also employed for tactical mission planning using the commonly used Falcon View flight planning software (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2016).

The vehicle contains multiple payloads, including global position system (GPS) navigation, encrypted digital data link, and electro-optical and infrared sensors (EO/IR). In terms of flight capabilities, the system claims a normal operating altitude of 500 feet, and a projected endurance of 90 minutes flight time at 300 feet above ground level (AGL) (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2016). Advertised mission limitations would be a cruising speed of approximately 30 kilometers/hour (~19 miles/hour) with an operating control range of 10 kilometers (~5.4 nautical miles) (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2016). Some of the platform capabilities/limitations such as altitude selection, total system weight to be carried by personnel (approximately 20 pounds), vehicle speed and control location may present operational risks for the operators and UAV, which are some factors to be used to form the ORM assessment tool.

Operational Risk Management

The primary objective of this assignment is to develop an ORM tool that the MQ-11B small UAS (sUAS) operators can utilize to mitigate flight risks, safely assess user and operational conditions, and subsequently evaluate aptitude to safely complete a mission. In general, the DOD/SECNAV 5000 series “requires program managers to establish a risk management program, provide continuous risk management, and determine how risks have changed” (Naval Air Systems Command, 2010). In order to develop a military-specific risk management scheme or tool, it is beneficial to assemble information and guidance promulgated from different branches of service that analyze risk at different levels.

Scale factors. As mentioned previously, this tool will incorporate logic from Air Force, Army and Navy aviation publications/instructions, as well as textbooks for UAS-specific knowledge, to generate a risk assessment tool. The measures of probability and severity were similar across the branches of service. In this tool, probability is quantified on a scale adopted from the MIL-STD-882E, and modified for use in OPNAVINST 3500.39C, as shown below in Figure 1. Potentially using a matrix that revolves around 4 levels for probability and 4 levels for severity can allow the risk assessment process for operational users easier to understand and numerically quantify risk.

Figure 1. Quantified probability levels/categories. Retrieved from Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3500.39C. Norfolk, VA, 2010.

Severity will be quantified using a modified scale adopted from the MIL-STD-882E and OPNAVINST 3500.39C, as shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below. System costs for the Raven are approximately 260,000.00 USD, and while the Figure illustrates losses for the marginal category as >$100K but <$1M, it should be noted that if the UAV is used in a combat zone supporting troops in contact (TIC), that the impact of a UAV loss can have catastrophic consequences. It is also desirable to use the OPNAVINST severity categories to emphasize not just death or injury, but mission impact as the inability to conduct the mission may have lethal consequences for troops in contact or lack of critical intelligence to conduct combat operations.

Figure 2.1. Quantified severity categories. Retrieved from Department of Defense, MIL-STD-882E.

Figure 2.2. Quantified severity categories. Retrieved from Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3500.39C. Norfolk, VA, 2010.

Explanation of terms. For this assignment, using the MIL-STD-882E to clearly define some key terms can help in how users can evaluate the conditions present in a flight scenario to best prepare for and mitigate risks. Risk is defined as a “combination of the severity of the mishap and the probability that the mishap will occur” with levels characterized by either low, medium, serious, or high (Department of Defense, 2012). Since the primary objective is to understand risks, the definition requires users to be familiar with the definitions of a mishap, probability, and severity. The term mishap includes negative environmental impacts from planned events, and is “an event or series of events resulting in unintentional death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property” (Department of Defense, 2012). A risk mitigation is intended to eliminate a hazard or minimize the likelihood of the risk occurring or lessen the severity. Probability is the likelihood of an event or occurrence, with severity indicating the “magnitude of potential consequences of a mishap” (Department of Defense, 2012). It should be noted that this includes death, injury, damage to or loss of equipment or property, damage to the environment, or monetary loss.

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) Development

            Having an in-depth understanding of the evaluated flight stages and initial safety operations pertaining to UAS operation is essential for this portion of the ORM assessment (Barnhart & Barnhart, 2012). In this stage of development, incorporating the first stage of the risk management process (i.e. identifying the risks) allows for users to clearly list the hazard, and consequences in terms of probability and severity. One question that may aid in determining the hazards associated with a flight in either a training or wartime environment is to simply ask “what is different about today?” Some of the specific hazards associated with the Raven UAV operation are listed in the PHA section below.

            MQ-11B operator considerations for deliberate ORM. Listing some of the hazards associated with the operation of the Raven sUAS using a simpler form which is adopted from the Army’s consolidated preliminary risk assessment worksheet located in the ATP 5-19 may be beneficial. This form is simple, highlights the absolute basic requirements for operators prior to engaging in field operations, and is shown in Figure 3 below. Listing all the potential hazards as they pertain to the daily concept of operations (CONOPS) may make listing them all easier, and make for a better method to quickly manage risk for missions requiring a deliberate ORM process as opposed to in-depth (Department of the Army, 2014).

Figure 3. Sample consolidated preliminary risk assessment worksheet. Retrieved from Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 5-19, Operational Risk Management, 2014.

Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA)

            If operation time constraints permit, utilizing the MIL-STD-882E form for the PHA may be beneficial for use in in-depth ORM schemes. Once all the specific hazards have been identified, it is essential to note what controls or mitigations can be implemented to reduce total risk. In the preliminary hazard assessment shown in Figure 4 below, some Raven-specific risks are addressed and sorted by vehicle, external, and operator evaluation areas.

(1)   Vehicle: Loss of Control/Mechanical failures in flight

(2)   Vehicle: Corrosion/mechanical failures on deck

(3)   Vehicle: Partial failure or total loss of navigation/ GPS systems

(4)   Vehicle: Loss of data link

(5)   External: Inclement weather conditions (i.e. sandstorms)

(6)   External: Collisions (with manned/unmanned vehicles, obstacles, buildings, etc.)

(7)   External: Counterintelligence risk (capture or detection of UAV by the enemy)

(8)   Operator: Pilot currency (i.e. use of software, last time maneuvering aircraft, operating area familiarity)

(9)   Operator: Control errors in the terminal phase (takeoff and landing)

(10) Operator: Vehicle assembly errors (battery, propeller, structural damage)

Figure 4. Completed PHA/L discussing some hazards associated with MQ-11B use in a combat desert environment.

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)

Identifying a corresponding mitigating action for each risk is important, and breaking down each phase of flight for planning, staging, launching, flight and recovery are the key phases for evaluation of risk (Barnhart & Barnhart, 2012). The hazard list and assessment (PHL and PHA) focus more on the planning aspect, while the operational hazard review and analysis is generated to track in-flight changes, realized risks, and new hazards to flight operations (Barnhart & Barnhart, 2012). Building on the hazards and mitigations from the PHA/L and standard from the MIL-STD-882E, Figure 5 below shows the resulting OHR&A.

Figure 5. Operational hazard review and analysis for the MQ-11B hazards.

ORM Assessment Tool

            Standardization when analyzing risk is extremely important, in that other entities wishing to use a system or method to quantify risk for a mission or training event or an organization wishes to pursue multiple flights in an area of responsibility (AOR), then the risk process can be uniformly addressed (Department of the Air Force, 2013). Using a proven system that evaluates each risk and quantifies it with a scale that includes the risk, probability, and severity can prove to be most effective as it has been used for many years. In this case, it is beneficial to use the risk assessment matrix delineated in AFI 90-802 and OPNAVINST 3500.39C, shown in Figure 6 below. This specific matrix is a derivative of the MIL-STD-882E, and uses a simpler 4 levels for probability and severity than the matrix. In order to determine overall flight risks, the risk assessment codes varying from 1 (critical) to 5 (negligible) will be used and annotated on the PHA/L for risk levels and residual risk levels.

Figure 6. Risk assessment matrix. Retrieved from Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3500.39C. Norfolk, VA, 2010.

Pitfalls associated with the risk matrix. Incorporating this logic into the final ORM assessment tool will be helpful as new threats develop and the need for flight crews to change their risk posture will become more prevalent. However, it should be noted that there are several pitfalls associated with using the risk assessment matrix. These include: over-optimism, misrepresentation, alarmism, indiscretion, prejudice, inaccuracy and enumeration (Department of the Navy, 2010). Not analyzing for root causes (i.e. over-optimism), bad or misunderstood data invalidating accurate risk assessments (i.e. inaccuracy) and difficulty assigning a numerical value due to human behaviors (i.e. enumeration) are some of the risk assessment pitfalls that may impact sUAS operators specifically (Department of the Navy, 2010).

Proposed ORM assessment tool. Figure 7 below shows a sample proposed ORM assessment tool that can be used by Raven UAS crews to identify hazards and quantify overall flight risk levels. In this example, the inputs are drawn from the PHA/L and OHR&A, where a “typical day” in a busy desert AOR are quantified for a Raven user.

Figure 7. Sample Raven user ORM assessment for a standard day in a desert combat area.

Recommendations and Conclusions

            Improving operations and reducing mishap risk. As military professionals, the personnel operating aircraft (manned or unmanned) are responsible for managing risk inherent in each unique task, while senior authorities are responsible for providing sufficient guidance, methods and strategies on how to best mitigate risk (Department of the Navy, 2010). The main purpose of ORM is to systematically identify hazards, weigh the risks against task or mission benefits, and implement controls to effectively minimize or offset overall risk (Department of the Navy, 2010). Through generating the proposed RAVEN risk assessment tool, flight crews should be able to effectively identify hazards using an in-depth ORM analysis method and implement effective controls to safely operate the MQ-11 in training or wartime environments. Encouraging the operators to utilize the risk matrix will provide each member the opportunity to exercise sound judgement prior to UAV use, and account for the varying daily conditions by asking: “what is different about today?”

            Initial and refresher ORM-focused training. It is important to target the audience and operational environment and tailor the risk training to their needs; emphasis needs to be placed on off-duty and on-duty personnel and overall readiness (Department of the Navy, 2010). Figure 8 below highlights what OPNAVINST 3500.39C recommends for career progression and training requirements.

Figure 8. Focus of ORM training throughout an aviation career. Retrieved from Department of the Navy Instruction OPNAVINST 3500.39C: Operational risk management. Norfolk, VA, 2010.

            Additionally, the proposed ORM assessment tool is meant to act as an in-depth ORM tool, and does not account for the other two types of risk management: deliberate and time-critical. Time critical ORM and decision-making abilities can be built upon from the logical progression taught as a part of in-depth. However, it is important to expose flight crews to the nature of time critical risk management (TCRM) principles. Assessing the situation, balancing resources, communicating to others, and “do and debrief” the event, represent the logical flow for a scenario requiring TCRM (Department of the Navy, 2010). Utilizing training events or simulations to mirror some of the TCRM skills that may need to be implemented may aid in enabling flight crews to effectively exercise good judgement while in a time sensitive situation (Department of the Navy, 2010).

                Flight hazard reporting. Much like the OHR&A is used to track individual flights, evaluating the realized risks for other flight crews conducting similar missions in other areas is extremely important in increasing battlespace awareness, and managing new emerging threats (Department of the Air Force, 2013). The importance of continuously reporting existing and new hazards can greatly benefit the sUAS community by appropriately reacting to and mitigating arising threats to promote a stream of safe and effective mission executions. Using a standardized reporting system for reporting hazards such as the flight information scheduling and tracking (FIST) and aviation safety awareness program (ASAP) will enable other flight crews to learn of other flight hazards (Department of the Navy, 2010). Additionally, the valuable lessons learned from these reports can be used for long-term trend hazards analysis (Naval Air Systems Command, 2016).

References

Marshall, M. D., Barnhart, R. K., Hottman, S. B., Shappee, E., & Most, M. T. (2011). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. New York, NY: CRC Publishing.

Department of the Air Force. (2013, February 11). Air Force instruction (AFI) 90-802: Risk management. Retrieved from http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_se/publication/afi90-802/afi90-802.pdf

Department of the Army. (2014, April). Army techniques publication (ATP) 5-19. Retrieved from http://www.benning.army.mil/RangeOps/content/blank_forms/ATP_5-19RiskManagement_Apr14.pdf

Department of the Navy. (2010, July 2). Navy Instruction OPNAVINST 3500.39C: Operational risk management. Retrieved from http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/nalo/Documents/SAFETY/OPNAVINST%203500.39C%20OPERATIONAL%20RISK%20MANEGEMENT.pdf

Naval Air Systems Command. (2010, July). NAVAIR Risk assessment handbook. Retrieved from http://mctechsystems.com/resources/NAVAIR_RISK_ASSESSMENT_HANDBOOK_july_2010.doc

Naval Air Systems Command. (2016, December 23). NAVAIR M-3750.1: Aviation safety management system. Retrieved from http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.download&key=67E03699-4D4B-40E3-8E91-380C7C63A5B8

U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. (2016). RQ-11B Raven small unmanned aircraft system (SUAS). Retrieved from http://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/aviation_raven-suas/